We estimate an open economy VAR model to quantify the effect of monetary policy and capital inflows shocks on the US housing market. The shocks are identified with sign restrictions derived from a standard DSGE model. We find that monetary policy shocks have a limited effect on house prices and residential investment. In contrast, capital inflows shocks driven by an increase in foreign savings have a positive and persistent effect on both housing variables. Other sources of capital inflows shocks, such as foreign monetary expansion or an increase in aggregate demand in the US, have a more limited role.
Introduction
One of the major sources of the …nancial and economic problems of the last three years was the collapse of the housing boom that had been developing in the United States since the mid-1990s. This paper considers the relative importance of two potential causes of the boom:
1. Global imbalances. One view is that the housing boom was caused by the increase in capital in ‡ows to the US that has been occurring since the mid-1990s. During that period, the US current account de…cit widened while other countries, especially oil exporters and Asian economies, have been building surpluses. The ‡ow of capital from EMEs to the US generated an increase in liquidity in the US …nancial system and drove down long term real interest rates. Low interest rates reduced the cost of borrowing and encouraged a credit boom and an increase in house prices.
Low risk-free rates led portfolio investors to allocate a larger part of their wealth to higher yielding (and riskier) assets, including US sub-prime residential mortgage backed securities and leveraged corporate loans. This hypothesis is advanced in King (2009) who suggests that "the origins of the crisis lie in the imbalances in the world economy which built up over a decade or more".
Loose monetary policy in the US.
This explanation also stresses the role of low interest rates in generating the housing boom. However, it attributes the decrease in interest rates to monetary policy loosening rather than an increase in foreign capital in ‡ows. According to this explanation, a fear of de ‡ation led the Federal Reserve to keep short term interest rates too low for too long. The reduction in the cost of borrowing encouraged a credit boom and an increase in house prices. This is the view in Taylor (2009) , who shows that, since the early 2000s, the Federal Funds rate has been signi…cantly lower than the level implied by the Taylor rule.
Both explanations could have some merit. How much weight should we put on each one? Figure 1 shows the evolution of the US current account balance and house prices. It is clear that the build up in house prices since the mid-1990s happened at the same time as the widening in the US current account de…cit. However, this does not imply causality and does not rule out the possibility of both variables being driven by some third factor. A piece of suggestive evidence in support of the hypothesis that global imbalances played a central role in the housing boom is the evolution of short and long-term nominal interest rates in the US ( Figure 2 ). As has been well documented, despite the rise in short-term interest rates from 2004 until the current crisis, long-term bond yields have remained low -the so-called 'long rate conundrum' (Greenspan (2005) ). This can be seen as evidence in favour of the global imbalances story: even though the Fed was increasing policy rates, long rates remained low over a period in which the US current account de…cit kept rising. However, there are other factors which may explain the low level of long rates, for example high corporate savings or an increase in monetary policy credibility. And the increase in short rates from 2004 to 2007 does not immediately discard the loose monetary policy story. This story is not simply about changes in short rates, but rather about deviations from the appropriate level of rates as suggested, for example, by the Taylor rule. A simple look at the data does not allow us to assess which of the two explanations is correct.
At present there are not yet many studies trying to disentangle its causes and quantify the relative contribution of di¤erent factors. In a recent speech, Bernanke (2010) discusses the link between monetary policy and house prices in the run up to the crisis. Using cross-country evidence, he shows that "countries in which current accounts worsened and capital in ‡ows rose had greater house price appreciation" in the period from 2001Q4 to 2006Q3. He concludes that capital in ‡ows seem to be a promising avenue for explaining cross-country di¤erences in real house price growth.
Capital in ‡ows into the US could be driven by di¤erent factors. For example, they could result from an increase in savings abroad, which pushes down long-term world interest rates and leads to an in ‡ow of capital into the US, a deterioration of the US current account and an appreciation of the dollar -this is the 'savings glut'hypothesis suggested in Bernanke (2005) . Alternatively, a monetary policy expansion abroad would reduce foreign interest rates and increase the relative attractiveness of US assets, leading to capital in ‡ows into the US. These two hypotheses -'savings glut'and monetary expansion abroad -point to external factors as explanations for the US current account de…cit. An alterative view attributes the de…cit to domestic factors, in particular an increase in domestic aggregate demand and a reduction in domestic savings. It is also possible that the reduction in macroeconomic volatility experienced in the US since the mid-1980s -the socalled "great moderation" -reduced precautionary savings in the US and increased the perceived safety of US assets, attracting capital ‡ows from abroad. We develop a framework to identify the contribution of US monetary policy and of these di¤erent sources of capital in ‡ows to the housing boom.
There is a relatively large literature on the e¤ect of monetary policy on house prices. The study that is closest to ours is Bracke and Fidora (2008) which explains the evolution of the US current account balance and asset prices by three types of shocks: monetary policy shocks, preference shocks (capturing changes in the savings rate), and investment shocks. The authors estimate two separate structural VARs, for the US and emerging Asia. For the US they look at a monetary policy expansion, a reduction in the savings rate and an increase in investment.
For emerging Asia they de…ne these shocks with the opposite signs (monetary policy contraction, increase in the savings rate and reduction in investment). The shocks are identi…ed by imposing sign restrictions on the impulse responses. The …ndings suggest that monetary shocks explain the largest part of the variation in the US current account balance and asset prices. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a standard DSGE model from which we derive the sign restrictions used to identify the structural VAR. Section 3 describes the econometric framework. Section 4 discusses the baseline empirical results and presents robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes.
Identi…cation
This section presents a standard DSGE model from which the sign restrictions used in the empirical exercise are derived. We follow closely the model in Ferrero, Gertler and Svensson (2007).
There are two countries: the US and the rest of the world (ROW). Each country has one representative household that consumes tradable and nontradable goods. Tradable goods can be produced at home or abroad. For simplicity, there are no capital goods.
In order to study current account dynamics, we assume imperfect international capital markets.
In particular, there is a single bond that is traded internationally and is denominated in units of home currency. In addition, investors in ROW may hold a bond denominated in units of foreign currency which is not traded internationally.
Model

Households
The household has a continuum of workers who consume and supply labor in the intermediate goods produce nontradable goods.
The preferences of the household are given by:
where period utility u t is given by:
C t is a composite of tradable (C T t ) and nontradable (C N t ) consumption goods:
The Cobb-Douglas speci…cation is employed to maintain analytical tractability. It implies an elasticity of substitution of unity between tradables and nontradables. In the calibration we let this elasticity (denoted by ) vary between 0:5 and 1:5.
Tradable consumption goods are a composite of home (C Ht ) and foreign (C F t ) tradables:
L Ht (f ) denotes hours worked by worker f in the home tradable sector and L N t (f ) denotes hours worked by worker f in the nontradable sector.
To ensure a determinate steady state in the presence of incomplete international …nancial markets, the discount factor t is endogenous and is determined by the recursion:
where C t is detrended consumption and & t is a preference shock, which follows a …rst order stochastic process:
A positive shock to & t increases the discount factor, making households more patient.
The household's budget constraint is give by:
where B t is nominal holdings at the beginning of period t + 1 of an internationally traded oneperiod risk-free bond denominated in home currency, I t is the gross nominal domestic currency interest rate, W t (f ) is the nominal wage of worker f and t are dividends net of lump sum taxes.
The price index P t can be derived from the household's expenditure minimization problem given the consumption composites (1) and (2) . It is given by the following function of the price of tradables P T t and the price of nontradables P N t :
where the price of tradables P T t is a function of the price of home tradables (P Ht ) and the price of foreign tradables expressed in home currency (P F t ):
The law of one price holds for tradables, i.e.:
where " t is the nominal exchange rate de…ned such that an increase represents an appreciation of the home currency. Foreign currency prices are denoted with a star.
Households maximize utility subject to the budget constraint. This gives the standard Euler equation for consumption-savings decisions:
and the labour supplies for each sector:
The allocation of consumption between tradables and nontradables is given by:
And the allocation between home and foreign tradables is given by:
Firms
Final Goods Sector Firms in the …nal goods sector combine intermediate goods to produce output using a CES production function:
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is given by > 1:
From cost minimization we get the demands for intermediate goods:
The price indices are aggregations of the prices of intermediate goods:
Intermediate Goods Sector Firms in the intermediate goods sector produce output using only labor according to a linear production function:
where A t is labor productivity.
Firms act competitively to minimize costs and set the nominal marginal cost equal to the nominal wage adjusted for productivity:
To introduce a role for monetary policy, the model includes nominal price rigidities. In particular, each period a fraction of intermediate goods …rms do not adjust prices. The fraction 1 that change prices set them to maximize the present discounted value of pro…ts:
The stochastic discount factor between t and t + s is given by t;t+s = t+s (
Intermediate goods …rms maximize (5) subject to the demand for their products (3) and the production function (4). The …rst order conditions for the optimal prices P O Ht and P O N t are:
The price index for each sector evolves according to:
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a simple interest rate rule with partial adjustment:
In log linear form, this equation is the familiar Taylor rule:
where ! t is a monetary policy shock which follows a …rst order stochastic process:
Current Account Dynamics and the Real Exchange Rate
Nominal bond holdings B t evolve according to:
where N X t is the real value of net exports:
The current account is the net change in real bond holdings:
The real exchange rate is given by:
Uncovered Interest Parity Condition
The foreign country has a similar structure to the home country, but ROW investors can hold a foreign bond in addition to the internationally traded bond. For them to be indi¤erent between holding these two types of bonds, the uncovered interest parity condition must hold:
Market Clearing
For the nontradable sector, production must equal demand:
For the home tradable sector, production must equal the sum of the demands by home and foreign consumers:
Because domestic bonds are in zero net supply, the sum of nominal holdings of the domestic bond by home and foreign investors must equal zero:
If these conditions are satis…ed, Walras'Law ensures clearing in the foreign tradable sector.
Robust Sign Restrictions
Shocks
We calibrate the model to study the e¤ects of di¤erent shocks. We are interested in distinguishing between two types of shocks: monetary policy and capital in ‡ows. While monetary policy shocks have been widely studied in the literature, the interpretation of capital in ‡ows shocks requires further explanation.
Capital in ‡ows into the US could be driven by di¤erent factors. For example, they could result from an increase in savings in ROW, which pushes down long-term world interest rates and leads to an in ‡ow of capital into the US, a deterioration of the US current account and an appreciation of the dollar -the 'savings glut'hypothesis suggested in Bernanke (2005) . Alternatively, a monetary policy expansion in ROW would reduce foreign interest rates and increase the relative attractiveness of US assets, leading to capital in ‡ows into the US. These two explanations -'savings glut'and ROW monetary expansion -point to external factors as explanations for the US current account
de…cit. An alterative view attributes the de…cit to domestic factors, in particular an increase in domestic aggregate demand and a reduction in domestic savings. Our analysis distinguishes between these di¤erent sources of capital in ‡ows.
We are interested in identifying separately the e¤ect of US monetary policy shocks and of di¤erent types of shocks that generate capital in ‡ows to the US. These shocks would be confounded if an improvement in the US monetary policy framework increased the perceived safety of US assets, encouraging foreign investors to invest more in the US. In that case, capital in ‡ows would be driven by monetary policy and it would not be possible to separate them. To address this issue, we separately identify a risk premium shock, which captures changes in the perceived safety of US assets as a result of a decline in macroeconomic risk due to the 'great moderation', for example.
By doing this, we are able to control for capital in ‡ows that are driven by improvements in the monetary policy framework. The component of capital in ‡ows that is left is not driven by monetary policy and we are able to do a 'horse race'between monetary policy and capital in ‡ows shocks and separate their contribution to the housing boom 1 .
To summarize, we calibrate the theoretical model and derive impulse responses to …ve types of shocks:
1. Expansionary monetary policy shock in the US. This is a negative shock to ! t in equation (6).
2. Reduction in aggregate demand in ROW. This is the 'savings glut'shock and can be seen as a positive shock to & t in ROW, which increases the discount factor and makes ROW households more patient.
3. Expansionary monetary policy shock in ROW. This is a negative shock to ! t in ROW.
4. Increase in aggregate demand in the US. This can be seen as a negative shock to & t in the US, which reduces the discount factor and makes US households more impatient.
5. Risk premium shock. This is a shock that increases the perceived safety of US assets. It can be seen as a reduction in t in equation (7), i.e., a reduction in the real interest rate that investors require in order to invest in the US.
Parameter Ranges
To derive robust implications from the theoretical model for each of these shocks that are not sensitive to variations in the structural parameters, we follow the approach in Peersman and Straub 
Dynamics
Having de…ned a sensible range of parameter values, we use the model to produce impulse responses for each shock. We assume that the parameters are uniformly distributed over the selected parameter range. We then draw a random value for each parameter from that range and calculate the impulse response functions. We report the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the impulse responses. These predictions are identical to the ones we obtain but with opposite signs, since we study the e¤ect of an increase rather than a reduction in capital in ‡ows to the US. We now turn to the risk premium shock. As discussed above, this shock is introduced to ensure that we can separate monetary policy and capital ‡ows shocks. It may be the case that capital in ‡ows to the US are driven by an improvement in its monetary policy framework, which generates an environment of low and stable in ‡ation and reduces the risk premium required by foreigners to invest in the US. This is empirically plausible since the US did experience a period of low and stable in ‡ation -the 'great moderation'-before the global …nancial crisis. Table 2 summarizes the sign restrictions that will be used in the empirical model to identify the shocks. The predictions of the model are su¢ cient to distinguish between all …ve shocks that we are considering, since there is at least one common and one di¤erent sign restriction for each pair of shocks. We allow for a possible zero impact of the shocks since the restrictions are imposed as or . The restrictions are imposed on impact and for two quarters after the shock. Note that the restriction on the long term nominal interest rate for monetary policy shocks does not necessarily follow from theory. We impose this restriction in order to avoid giving an advantage to 'savings glut'shocks in the 'horse race'to explain the housing boom. Because long term interest rates fall with a 'savings glut' shock and these are the rates that determine the cost of housing loans, if we did not impose this restriction for monetary policy shocks we would be increasing the chances of 'savings glut'shocks explaining most of the variation in the housing variables. We therefore impose this restriction for monetary policy shocks as well and retain only those shocks that do not lead to an increase in long term nominal interest rates.
3 Econometric Framework
Reduced Form Model and Data
We estimate the following open economy vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
where c is a constant term, L is the lag length, Y t is a vector of endogenous variables, A i is a matrix of coe¢ cients and u t is the error term. The vector Y t contains twelve endogenous variables. in Figure 1 , which shows that house prices have substantially increased since the late 1990s. To get around these issues, we use an explicit Bayesian prior to deal with the dimensionality problem. In particular, we use the prior suggested in Litterman (1986) , often referred to as the Minnesota prior. Banbura, Gianonne and Reichlin (2007) provide an intuitive explanation for this type of prior and show that its application to large Bayesian VARs results in good forecasting performance.
The basic principle behind the Minnesota prior is that the variables in the VAR are 'centered' around a random walk with a drift so that the prior mean can be associated with the following representation for Y t :
This corresponds to shrinking the diagonal elements of A 1 in model (8) towards one and shrinking the o¤-diagonal coe¢ cients as well as the coe¢ cients in A 2 ; :::; A L towards zero 5 . This prior is appropriate for variables that show a high degree of persistence, but is not appropriate for variables believed to be characterized by substantial mean reversion. Therefore, for short and long term interest rates and the exchange rate we impose the prior of white noise by setting the prior mean equal to zero.
Identi…cation of the Shocks
To identify the shocks in the data, we use the sign restrictions derived from the theoretical model and reported in Table 2 . We are interested in identifying two types of shocks: an expansionary monetary policy shock and an increase in capital ‡ows to the US.
The common identi…cation problem in VAR models is that some restrictions need to be imposed on the covariance matrix in order to identify the structural shocks. Model (8) What is needed is to …nd a matrix B such that u t = Bv t , where the jth column of B represents the immediate impact on all variables of the jth structural shock, one standard error in size. The only restriction on B comes from the variance-covariance matrices of the reduced and structural form shocks:
This leaves many degrees of freedom in specifying B and hence further restrictions are necessary to achieve identi…cation. The usual methodology is to impose a certain ordering on the sequencing of shocks -Choleski decomposition. This corresponds to imposing zero restrictions on the con- To strike a balance between relying on theory to select impulse responses that look 'reasonable'
and allowing the data to speak for itself, we impose a parsimonious set of sign restrictions. In particular, we do not impose any restrictions on the responses of real residential investment and real house prices, which are the variables we chose to capture developments in the housing market.
Instead, we leave them unrestricted and rely on the other variables for identi…cation. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses over …ve years obtained from estimating model (8) using the sign restrictions in Table 2 . The solid vertical lines indicate the responses for which sign restrictions were imposed. We plot the median and the 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution of impulse responses. If the distribution was normal, these percentiles would correspond to a one standard deviation band. These results suggest that US monetary policy played a limited role in the housing boom that occurred in the run up to the global …nancial crisis. The housing boom is better explained by looking at shocks that generated an increase in capital in ‡ows to the US. Among these shocks, an 7 This result appears inconsistent with previous studies which found a signi…cant e¤ect of monetary policy on house prices -for example, Iacoviello (2005) and Jarociński and Smets (2008) . However, it should be noted that most of these studies rely on zero restrictions for identi…cation of monetary policy shocks, whereas our identi…cation relies only on sign restrictions. Using a framework more comparable to ours, Del Negro and Otrok (2007) …nd a signi…cant but small e¤ect of monetary policy shocks on residential investment and house prices using a VAR in …rst di¤erences. Their model estimated in levels delivers even smaller e¤ects. increase in savings in ROW -'savings glut'-played a particularly important role. An increase in real house prices of 0:52% may seem small, given that house prices doubled in the period from 1990 to 2007. However, we should note that, because the coe¢ cients in the model are time invariant, the impulse responses show the e¤ect of the shocks on average over the whole sample period. It could be that 'savings glut'shocks have become more important from the mid-1990s as a result of …nancial globalization. Also, we are simulating the responses to a one-time shock. With repeated shocks over time, the cumulative response would be larger. In our view, the message to be taken from these impulse responses is that 'savings glut' shocks provide a better explanation to the housing boom than US monetary policy and other shocks that lead to capital in ‡ows to the US.
Empirical Evidence
Baseline Results
One way of comparing the relative contributions of di¤erent types of shocks is through variance decompositions. We ask what fraction of the variance of the k-step ahead forecast revision E t (Y t+k ) E t 1 (Y t+k ) in, for example, real house prices, is accounted for by monetary policy and capital ‡ows shocks. Table 4 reports the variance decompositions at di¤erent forecast horizons. Shocks which reduce aggregate demand in ROW -'savings glut'shocks -explain a larger fraction of the variation in real residential investment and real house prices than other types of shocks at all forecast horizons.
For example, at a forecast horizon of 20 quarters, negative aggregate demand shocks in ROW explain about 7:5% of the variation in real residential investment and 10:7% of the variation in real house prices. We interpret 10:7% as a sizable fraction, given that house prices should be a¤ected by other shocks that we are not identifying, such as mortgage market innovations.
The variance decompositions con…rm the limited role of US monetary policy shocks in explaining the housing boom -these shocks explain less than 3% of the variation in real residential investment and house prices. Other shocks which generate capital in ‡ows to the US explain a larger fraction of the variation in the housing variables than US monetary policy shocks, but are less important than 'savings glut'shocks 8 . 
Robustness
As discussed in Section 3, sign restrictions allow identi…cation of the structural shocks v from the reduced form errors u t = Bv t . Because the structural shocks satisfy the condition E(vv 0 ) = I, the matrix B needs to satisfy the restriction:
= E(u t u 
Conclusions
Prior to the crisis, academics and commentators worried about the sustainability of the US current account de…cit and discussed the magnitude of the dollar depreciation that would be required to balance the current account. Here we look at imbalances from a di¤erent perspective, focusing on their role in driving down long-term real interest rates and encouraging a house price boom.
Our results suggest that 'savings glut' shocks played a bigger role in driving up house prices than the Federal Reserve's loose monetary policy. While monetary policy shocks had no signi…cant e¤ect on US real residential investment and real house prices, 'savings glut'shocks had a positive and persistent e¤ect on both housing variables. Results from variance decompositions suggest that, at a forecast horizon of 20 quarters, 'savings glut' shocks explain 7:5% of the variation in real residential investment and 10:7% of the variation in real house prices. By contrast, monetary policy shocks explain less than 3% of the variation in both housing variables. Other shocks which generate capital in ‡ows to the US explain a larger fraction of the variation in the housing variables than US monetary policy shocks, but are less important than 'savings glut'shocks. These results highlight the importance of developing policies to prevent the build up of large current account imbalances.
